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Senior Editor's Note

Bertil Belfrage

In 1977, the first issue of *Berkeley Newsletter*, edited by E. J. Furlong and David Berman, was published and distributed by the Philosophy Department at George Berkeley's old university: Trinity College in Dublin. In 1986, David Berman became the sole editor, from 1994 onwards assisted by Paul O'Grady. This first chapter in the history of the *Newsletter* ended in 1998 with the publication of issue number 15.

Thanks to the generosity of Hampden-Sydney College, Hampden-Sydney, VA, USA, which has agreed to host our web site, we are happy to announce the revival of the *Berkeley Newsletter* in the different format of a web journal.

With this issue we have taken a first step towards creating the newsletter such as we want to see it in the future. In the present issue we are also looking back, however. In collaboration with David Berman we can present the new *Berkeley Newsletter* as a continuation of the old, publishing it as number 16 together with back issues of number 1-15. We have also collected together bibliographical notes from past issues into the start of a new Berkeley bibliography. This new bibliography is intended to supplement T.E. Jessop's *Bibliography of George Berkeley* (The Hague 1973) and "A Bibliography of George Berkeley 1963-1979" by Colin Turbayne and R. Appelbaum (in Turbayne 1982). As our bibliographical project is badly in need of completion, we urge our readers to inform our bibliographical editor about any items that have been overlooked in the present list and also of any new publications that are relevant to the study of George Berkeley. Our readers are most welcome to address suggestions and contributions to the editors.

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Review

Berkeley: Langage de la perception et art de voir, Dominique Berlioz, ed., Presses Universitaires de France, 2003, 217 pp.

In her book *Berkeley. Langage de la perception et art de voir*, Dominique Berlioz has collected six studies about Berkeley's *An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision* (NTV).

The first essay by Geneviève Brykman goes through the main theses of Berkeley's philosophy of vision and points out the different relationships between some of his theses and what Locke writes regarding sensitive perception in his *Essay concerning human understanding*. According to Geneviève Brykman two of Berkeley's main theses—namely on vision being a language and on the heterogeneity between visual and tangible ideas—can be related to different parts of Locke's *Essay*. More precisely it has to do with Locke's concept of simple ideas, with the impossibility to define simple ideas, with the thought experience of the eye-microscope and with the discussion of Molyneux's question.

In the second essay Philippe Hamou explores the meaning of Berkeley's thesis of vision as a language in the context of Berkeley's philosophy as well as in the one of the classical theories of vision of Kepler, Descartes and Locke. According to Philippe Hamou, the thesis of vision as a language constitutes the profound paradigm of Berkeley's concept of vision. This linguistic model of visual perception is sustained by Berkeley in opposition to the classical model which the author characterises as being causal, projective and semiotic. The first two characteristics of the classical model are related to the concept of light—objective and mechanistic—which is affirmed by the theories of Kepler and Descartes. The semiotic model is what enables us to make a connection between the objective and quantitative features of the causal model with the qualitative variations of the subjective experience. According to the semiotic interpretation of vision, the sensible qualities are "natural signs" of the properties of material objects which affect mechanically the organs of sense. For Hamou, the thesis of vision as a language provokes a profound break with the classical theory since it represents the extreme development of the semiotic model which comes in clear opposition with the causal model of the classical theory. In the context of this revolution Berkeley transforms the semiotic model into a linguistic one: the signs of a language are capable to articulate and compose themselves and therefore they manage to express a set of meanings which is infinitely richer than the one of simple signs. Berkeley's theory of vision constitutes an important basis for the abandoning of the causal scheme and therefore for the affirmation of immaterialism.

Jean-Michel Vienne's essay examines the origin of the objects' unity in Locke and Berkeley and the connecting point between consciousness and pre-consciousness in Berkeley's text on vision. In the process linking the different sensations into one sensible object, Vienne distinguishes and opposes two different means: suggestion and judgement.

"Suggestion," as it is presented in *A Theory of Vision Vindicated* (TVV), is characterised as a connection founded on habits and experience while "judgement" implies a necessary and explicit inference. The discrepancy between suggestion and judgement on the one hand and the importance which Berkeley assigns to suggestion in his explanation of visual perception on the other are the basis of Berkeley's critique of the intellectualised explanation of vision of geometrical optics.

The author of the fourth essay is Richard Glauser. Here the author analyses the structure of mediate perception in Berkeley's theory of vision. In the classical model of mediate perception—in which an idea is perceived in a mediate manner through the immediate perception of another idea—Glauser maintains that it is important to distinguish between the ideas suggested by the immediate perception of an idea and the ideas signified by it. The relationship of suggestion is not invariable since it depends on the correlation between visual and tangible ideas, as experienced by the subject. The relationship of signification is fixed and constant, and a visual idea signifies a tangible idea independently from the ideas they suggest to a subject. The relationship of suggestion therefore would depend on the experience of the subject, whereas the relationship of signification would be instituted by God and independent of the development coming from experience. This distinction which remains implicit in most of Berkeley's texts is what would allow the distinction between veridical and non-veridical mediate perception. As a matter of fact, in veridical perception, the suggested ideas correctly represent the ideas signified in the language of the "Author of Nature." Conversely, in non-veridical perception, the immediately received ideas suggest ideas to the imagination that are different from what they actually mean in the language founded by God.

In the fifth essay, "Apprendre à voir: les enseignements de la *Défense de la Théorie de la vision*," Margaret Atherton uses the differences in the structure in NTV and TVV to give a new understanding of Berkeley's theory of vision. In a famous passage from TVV Berkeley calls it a synthetic presentation of his philosophy of vision and opposes it to NTV, in which he writes that he had found truth beginning from "false and popular suppositions." Atherton asserts that the order-inversion shows in a more precise way than in NTV that the spatial organisation of visual ideas is the product of a constructive process and not a deliverance of the visual system. Visual ideas are first deprived of all kinds of spatial organisation, but through experience they progressively stabilise and organise themselves according to the spatial order of touch. The existence of this process of acquisition explains why in specific parts of NTV Berkeley refers to visual ideas as having spatial characteristics, when at other moments he affirms that visual ideas aren't spatial ideas: in the first case, visual ideas have been already stabilised and organised by the sense of touch; in the second case visual ideas are not spatial because they have been acquired only by sight independently from all associations of touch. Therefore this interpretation shows a new way of understanding the "false and popular suppositions" that constitute the starting point of NTV: what is "false and popular" is the belief to perceive extensions and figures directly by sight since what we really perceive when sight is not associated to touch are ideas totally deprived of spatial organisation.

In the last essay, Bertil Belfrage maintains the importance of considering NTV primarily as a scientific text. By restricting the metaphysical implications of NTV, Belfrage's essay is in opposition with the great majority of interpretations of this work. A first argument in favour of this "scientific" interpretation of NTV is the "principle of autonomy of the spheres of discourse" affirmed by Berkeley in *De Motu* (71-72). According to this principle, it is possible to distinguish different spheres of discourse which refer to different sorts of objects and suppose different conceptions of causality. In the light of this principle of autonomy, the aim of NTV could be seen as the establishment of a set of regular sequences of visual phenomena. Indeed, on several occasions Berkeley points out the existence of a proportionality between certain features of the stimuli (of which we are not aware of) and the features of the visual qualities such as they are represented in conscience. An example of this proportionality is the correspondence between the degree of convergence of the rays of light on the retina and the degree of distinction of the visual appearance (NTV 77). According to this interpretation, Berkeley doesn't believe that geometrical optics is entirely invalid; rather, he criticises it because it doesn't answer the question of the psychology of vision. The major contribution of the NTV can then be seen as the development of a psychology of vision as an empirical and an experimental discipline.

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Abstracts for the 2005 International Berkeley Conference Tartu, Estonia

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"Berkeley's Corpuscular Theories in *Siris*"
by Timo Airaksinen

Berkeley's *Siris* (1744) is an unduly neglected treatise. It reveals and confirms its author's philosophical achievements. The greatest of them is his double aspect account of causality. *Siris* is based on the distinction between natural causes, which are mere regularities between phenomena, and agent causality, which is an efficient force. Berkeley tries to show that agents can influence the world by using aethereal corpuscles as their instruments. These particles are both material and in some sense immaterial or occult because they follow and do not follow the laws of nature. *Siris* is a rhetorical text which uses analogy, metaphor, paradox, and ambiguity to illuminate the reader. The point is that the universe is ambiguous with respect to its material and immaterial essence. The world is at the same time scientific and material and metaphysical and immaterial. Berkeley does not always keep those two aspects apart from each other as he tries to convince the reader that such an ambiguity is both unavoidable and basically incomprehensible. He fights a losing battle against scientific realism and materialism. This I take to be the key to the mystery of *Siris.*

"A Worry About Divine Perception in Berkeley"
by Michael C. Allers

The following thesis about divine perception has occasionally been attributed to Berkeley:

> (DP) Things continue to exist when unperceived by human minds because God perceives them.

The attribution of DP to Berkeley is normally motivated by a handful passages from the *Dialogues*, which are most naturally read as establishing DP. Some scholars, especially Bennett (1971), Pitcher (1977), and Winkler (1989), have worried about the attribution of DP to Berkeley. But, these scholars have not told us why DP is problematic. This is unfortunate, since they go to great lengths to offer alternative readings of the *Dialogues* passages normally read as establishing DP. In this paper, I say why DP is problematic. I argue that DP is inconsistent with a certain thesis that Berkeley held about the relation between real existence and immediate perception. In particular, I argue that Berkeley was

committed to the strong thesis that real things just are immediately perceived things, and that commitment, on pain of contradiction, precludes the attribution of DP to Berkeley.

"The Biased Presentation of George Berkeley's *Works*"
by Bertil Belfrage

In their Introductions to *The Works of George Berkeley*, A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop defend an interesting and important interpretation of Berkeley's philosophy, but at the same time they level destructive criticism against a series of Berkeleian texts: the *Theory of Vision* is not a reliable source of his philosophy; we read that *De Motu* "is a slight and disappointing work" ("apart from the *Principles* the *De Motu* would be nonsense"), *Alciphron* has been "left to students of philosophy—quite wrongly, because these have his philosophy elsewhere," et cetera.

There is a marked difference, however, between the basic task of presenting a text (as an editor or a historian) and the task of exposing, analyzing and supporting interesting aspects of this text (as a philosopher). In this paper, I shall *not* comment on Berkeley's philosophy or the interpretation of his texts, I shall concentrate exclusively on scholarly matters.

The editors claim—in Introductions and elsewhere—that they present nothing but "facts" and theses based on "exact scholarship." I shall argue the very contrary view: that their most influential proposals are scholarly, unfounded ad hoc hypotheses put forward to support *one* particular aspect on Berkeley. This does not mean that this aspect is "mistaken" or less important. But it opens the possibility that a careful reading of those texts, which the editors have banned, could open up new aspects on Berkeley; aspects, which have remained unexplored as a consequence of a systematically biased presentation of Berkeley's works.

"Berkeley on the Privacy of Sensible Ideas"
by Talia Mae Bettcher

According to many interpretations of Berkeley, an idea of sense is privately accessible to only one mind and cannot exist without being perceived by that mind. However, it has also been controversially argued (most notably by A. A. Luce) that a Berkeleian idea of sense is a publicly available item which can exist independently of being perceived by any one particular finite mind (or, indeed, any finite mind at all). In this paper, I attempt to answer some of the deep problems which confront such a view. After answering these concerns, I go on to provide a preliminary defense of the claim that for Berkeley, in an important respect there is no deep fact of the matter whether an idea of sense is public or private and no deep fact of the matter whether an idea of sense, perceived by some finite mind, can also exist independently of that mind.

"Prejudice and Suggestion"
by Wolfgang Breidert

The elimination of prejudice was one of the most important aims of the enlightenment. Berkeley was involved in this endeavor, but he was struggling against the prejudices and in favor of them, too ("there are and must be prejudices . . . if you strip men of prejudices . . . you will soon find them so many monsters"). For the clarification of this apparent inconsistency we have to consider the different kinds of prejudices (in the theory of perception and in the moral or social context), the conditions and causes of their origin (education, inclination, language, time), the ways to get rid of them (education once more, candor, comparison of cultures, suspension of judgment), and the question why we should struggle against the bias of prejudice. Some special problems ref. prejudices are to be considered (seeing of distance, the "crooked" oar, existence of matter, the prejudices of the Christians). Berkeley could not give any criterion for the distinction of good and bad prejudices. "Some prejudices are grounded in truth, reason, and nature." Later on Nietzsche demolished even this foundation by his disdain of the respect paid to knowledge, which he regarded as the greatest prejudice.

"Berkeley and Husserl on Geometrical Demonstrations"
by Richard J. Brook

When we demonstrate, using a diagram on a blackboard, that the three angels of a triangle equal two right angles, what is our demonstration about? Husserl takes Berkeley to task for thinking the demonstration is about the drawn figure. This is not quite right since Berkeley, as Husserl notes, thinks if the proof ignores the particularities of the drawn triangle, its particular angles, for example, we can say the demonstration holds for any triangle. But, as Husserl notes, as well, since the drawn "triangle" is not strictly a triangle, the demonstration is certainly not about it or any actual figure.

I propose to explore some ways Berkeley might have answered Husserl, and problems with these answers. A proof is certainly not about the abstract idea of a triangle, since Berkeley believes all ideas (given his conception of ideas) are particulars. Among the possibilities I look at are: (I) demonstration in geometry is purely hypothetical; we can only say things such as, if we have a triangle, the sum of its interior equal two right angles. But this view butts up against some passages that suggest Berkeley thinks proof is in fact about the diagram used for demonstration, as well as figures it presumably represents. A more reasonable suggestion is (2) When a teacher, for example, uses words like "point," "line," "plane," etc. these terms are implicitly defined by the Euclidean postulates. A line then is an entity such that two of them intersect at only one point, is the shortest distance between two points, etc. This would make the board diagram an 'aid' (as Husserl would put it) to the proof but the proof is not about the diagram.

For (2) we distinguish between the kind of abstraction Berkeley accepts and idealization/ axiomatization. Legitimate abstraction, he thinks, ignores the particular as opposed to generic characteristics of the diagram. But this isn't sufficient for a proof to go through.

Idealization/axiomatization, much in the spirit of Aristotle, begins with the empirical boundaries of figures (e.g., those constructed with straight edge and compass), idealizes them (e.g., points will be said to have only position, lines will be one dimensional, be said to intersect at only one point, etc.), then constructs an axiom system where the fundamental terms ("point," "line," etc.) are implicitly defined by the Euclidean postulates. Proof itself is a purely formal matter. I tend to think (2) is the most likely candidate to make coherent Berkeley's views about demonstration in geometry, and shows why, as Berkeley emphasizes, geometry is ultimately useful. Of course we still face the problem that proof can't be about any particular construction. Berkeley perhaps could give up that notion (if he indeed had it) and preserve much of what he wants to say about proof, as well as what he wants to say about the object of geometry itself, that it is sensible extension constructed out of discrete minima.

"Berkeley's Premises for a Theodicy"
by Geneviève Brykman

Berkeley regarded it a matter of fact that the world is governed by a wise and benevolent Providence: no more is needed but to open one's eyes to see nature as a [coherent?] language of God. But the pressing question, heavily discussed in the 18th century, concerns the origin of evil. In *De Origine Mali* (1702), William King responded to Bayle's objection in the *Dictionary*, Leibniz invented the term *theodicy* in 1710, etc. My intention is to show, how Berkeley, against this background, was able to explain and justify the existence of evil in the world.

"The Berkeley-Leibniz Relation"
by Stephen H. Daniel

It is not unusual to see commentators remark on how Leibniz and Berkeley at times sound alike and even might share certain views—for example, on a seemingly phenomenalist description of physical bodies, the centrality of perceivers in defining reality, the dispensability of matter, and the critique of Newton's account of space. Indeed, it is hard not to think of Berkeley when reading some of Leibniz's early comments, such as "I seem to myself to have discovered that to exist is nothing other than to be sensed—to be sensed, however, if not by us, then at least by the Author of things" (1672); and "to be [esse] is simply nothing other than being able to be perceived" (1675). But for years scholars have maintained that the apparent similarities between the mature Leibniz and Berkeley are more than offset by their differences, some of which even the two thinkers themselves identify.

By focusing on how certain features of Berkeley's and Leibniz's doctrines complement one another, I argue instead that their purported differences are much less profound than is often thought. Specifically, I suggest that Berkeley and Leibniz do not differ (other than in presentation and emphasis) on three important issues: (1) bodies are phenomena whose existence consists in being perceived by substances; (2) perceptions of real,

scientifically knowable things should not be understood apart from their appearance in a sequence of ordered experiences; and (3) recognition of the congruence of such experiences requires understanding the relation of metaphysics and science in a way that overcomes what is often thought to be the topic that most separates Berkeley and Leibniz, namely, how Berkeley's doctrine of *minima sensibilia* relates to Leibniz's doctrine of infinite divisibility.

"Anti-Berkeley"
by Georges Dicker

I argue that although Berkeley's arguments against the existence of matter are often effective against their targets, those targets fall into two classes: views only weakly or inconstantly held by Locke and the other "modern philosophers" whom Berkeley opposes, and views which, even if they were more firmly held by them, no friend of matter needs to hold. I support this thesis by reference to Berkeley's attacks on substance-substratum, on the representational theory of perception, and on the theory of primary and secondary qualities. But since the thesis is too sweeping to be established in a 30-minute presentation, I offer it as a hypothesis that may garner more support, or else encounter counterevidence, in the discussion period.

"Berkeley on Ideas, 'Fleeting, indeed, and changeable.'"
by Marc A. Hight

Berkeley informs us on a number of occasions that ideas are fleeting and perpetually changing beings. As it turns out, Berkeley is not alone in this claim, as most of the early moderns endorsed this seemingly obvious truism. Yet at no point does Berkeley actually provide any explicit argument for why ideas must all be fleeting and changeable. In this paper I seek first to reconstruct why Berkeley (and by extension, other early moderns as well) took this claim to be so obvious, and second to explore the consequences to his metaphysical system should one remove this assumption.

"Berkeley's Criticism of the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities"
by Jorgen Huggler

In the 20th century two major Danish philosophers, Peter Zinkernagel and David Favrholdt, have tried to refute Berkeley's immaterialism: Zinkernagel (1957, 1962, 1988) by codifying "conditions for description," Favrholdt (1994, 1999, 2002)—inspired by Zinkernagel and Niels Bohr—by a reformulation of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. In my paper I'll present and discuss Favrholdt's attempt and its presuppositions.

"James Frederick Ferrier's Reading of Berkeley: A Reappraisal of Reidian Historiography"
by Laurent Jaffro

In this paper, I examine the contribution of the Scottish idealist James Frederick Ferrier (1808-1864) to the historiography of Berkeley's philosophy. Before Ferrier and his "Berkeley and Idealism" (1842), the way of reading Berkeley which was prevailing in Scottish universities put stress on his doctrine of ideas and did not pay much attention to Berkeley's doctrine of spirits nor to his own form of direct realism. From Thomas Reid to William Hamilon, Berkeley was viewed as a good sample of the "ideal system" or of subjective idealism. Ferrier's critique of Reidian historiography is an important moment in the history of the reception of Berkeley's thought.

"Passive Obedience and the Law of Nature"
by Roomet Jakapi

Berkeley's moral philosophy in *Passive Obedience* is often described in terms of religious rule-utilitarianism, as opposed to act-utilitarianism, non-religious utilitarianism, and so on. In this paper I want to challenge that interpretation by providing an alternative reading. I regard Berkeley as a natural law theorist, whose main theoretical concern, in *Passive Obedience*, is to show that the principle "Thou shalt not resist the supreme power" (in his understanding of it) is a precept of the law of nature. Berkeley speaks about the promotion of the well-being of mankind in the context of a natural law theory.

"Towards a New Biography of Berkeley"
by Tom Jones

In this paper I will present preliminary research into some areas of Berkeley's life that are not particularly well documented in the existing accounts. My emphasis will be on cultural connections that appear to have relatively little personal and philosophical importance, but which may help us to understand Berkeley's place in eighteenth-century literary culture in a broad sense. The paper will concentrate on Berkeley's British and Anglophone context, but I also want to suggest that there are possibilities for further research in Berkeley's time in France and Italy.

Since Alexander Campbell Fraser's 1871 *Life*, little use has been made of the correspondence addressed to Berkeley to be found in the British Library. Looking at Bishop Secker's letters to Berkeley I want to suggest that Berkeley's elevation to a bishopric in 1734, whilst it might have led to a life of relative retirement in Cloyne, also led Berkeley to feel more connected with an Anglican elite on the other side of the Irish sea. The correspondence with Secker suggests a sense of mutual collaboration on intellectual projects that alters A. A. Luce's emphasis on the domestic trend in Berkeley's intellectual life in the later 1730s and 1740s. I will also investigate the overwhelmingly negative view of Berkeley's intellectual projects that Warburton presents in his 1766

edition of Pope's *Works*. I will suggest that Warburton's attitudes to Berkeley, and particularly Berkeley's work on vision, may be traced in sections of Warburton's *The Divine Legation of Moses* on hieroglyphs and visual language. I suggest Warburton's response is indicative of the ambivalence many people felt towards Berkeley's life and works: one might say similar things about Bolingbroke's relationship with Berkeley, for example.

I will go on to present an account of the sale of books from the Berkeley library that was conducted by Sotheby's in 1796. The annotated sale catalogue notes the buyers of some volumes. I will identify some of these buyers and try to sketch contemporary interest in Berkeley at this time of political upheaval.

In conclusion I will suggest that one might make similar investigations into Berkeley's relationships with l'Abbé d'Aubigne, his guide in Paris, people he met in Italy such as Tomasso Campailla, and people he might have met in Italy, such as Basil Kennet. My overarching suggestion is that a new synthetic study of Berkeley's life might produce interesting new emphases on acknowledged facts of his life, and perhaps even bring new evidence to light.

"Berkeley and Leibniz"
by Charles McCracken

Leibniz wrote, "I seem to myself to have discovered that to exist is nothing other than to be sensed [sentiri]—sensed, if not by us, then at least by the author of things." He makes similar claims in a number of places. This suggests a kinship of Leibniz's views to Berkeley's, and indeed after he read Berkeley's *Principles*, Leibniz wrote (in his own copy of that work), "Much in this [book] is right and agrees with my own way of thinking." In particular, Leibniz too believed that bodies cannot exist independently of perceivers. But there were important differences in their views about bodies, too. This paper examines both the points of agreement in their doctrines of what bodies are, and the points at which they differ.

"The Formalist Interpretation of Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics"
by Miles Macleod

In recent times one of principal ways of understanding Berkeley on mathematics has been to focus on and emphasise the formalist sounding elements of his work. Some have imputed to Berkeley a realisation, or at least an anticipation of, the essential postulates of 20th century theorists in this regard. For instance it has been put forward by Warnock with regard geometry that Berkeley came to think of it as an uninterpreted formal system, meaningful only in application.

While it is fascinating to think of Berkeley as such a revolutionary figure, this interpretation doesn't bear up to close analysis. A reconstruction of Berkeley's position on mathematics cannot be made to easily fit with it. In fact it is hopelessly removed from the context of his motivations for addressing mathematics and his general philosophical principles, particularly his theory of meaning. Berkeley certainly wanted to shake mathematics free of speculative and metaphysical ideas, but not meaning altogether. By challenging the formalist interpretation we will in this paper be able to develop a more astute and relevant picture of his philosophy of mathematics, one more in tune with his philosophical concerns.

"Berkeley's Concept of Certainty"
by George Pappas

Berkeley speaks in the Commentaries of his conception of certainty as though his concept of certainty differs in important ways from the way that some of his important predecessors think of that concept. Berkeley also says that according to his concept of certainty, we have knowledge of ordinary objects, indeed immediate, non-inferential knowledge of objects; but that such knowledge is lacking if we make use of his predecessors concept of certainty. The concept Berkeley finds in his predecessors is that of the impossibility of mistaken belief, and on this concept of certainty of course Berkeley is right in what he says about his several predecessors. We would not have certain knowledge of objects in that sense of the term. What is not so clear is why Berkeley thinks we would have certain knowledge of objects given his way of understanding the notion of certainty. In this paper I examine this question afresh, and I argue that ultimately Berkeley is completely right. I also argue that the point he is making is a much-neglected but very important one concerning how to understand the concept of certainty. This point was first noticed, I think, in Ockham and then forgotten until Berkeley's recognition of the essential ideas.

"Berkeley's Christian Enlightenment"
by Silvia Parigi

Berkeley's thought has often been considered as unrelated to, or even directly opposite to, the general atmosphere of the Enlightenment, though it pervaded Berkeley's times and his literary and philosophical circle. In particular, Berkeley's so-called "second" philosophy, expressed in *De Motu*, *Alciphron*, *Theory of Vision Vindicated*, and above all *Siris*, was often judged post-immaterialist and anti-illuministic. This essay will show that:

- the concept of "Christian Enlightenment" is historically legitimate and theoretically useful
- the historiographic category of Christian Enlightenment may cast some light on Berkeley's figure and on the entire development of his philosophy, from the *Philosophical Commentaries* to the *Siris*, giving it unity and coherence
- there never was a "first" and "second" Berkeleian philosophy

"Berkeley and Natural Philosophy: The Problem of Chemistry"
by Luc Peterschmitt

One the most important aims of Berkeley when he wrote the *Principles of Human Knowledge* was to reform sciences, in sort of, as the title of the Dialogues expresses it "rendering the sciences more easy, useful and compendious." The problem I'd like to study is this: Berkeley does not examine all sciences. Particularly, in 1710 and 1713, he does say a word about chemistry.

The reasons of this lack show, to my mind, what is Berkeley's attitude towards natural philosophy: a kind of conservative reform. The first reason is biographical: it seems that Berkeley did not know well chemistry about 1710—which renders impossible any reform, of course. A second reason, sounder, is due to the fact that the criticisms of chemistry Berkeley could have given are themselves a "chemical" commonplace—as if it was impossible to criticize chemistry without being oneself a chemist. In short, Berkeley was "only" a philosopher—and his reform of science is only a philosophical one: with immaterialism, all (all which is source of difficulty in science) changes, but nothing (results and demonstrations) has to change. It seems that in this context, chemistry remained a problem for immaterialism.

"Berkeley's Explanation of the Cognitive Impenetrability of Optical Illusions"
by Ralph Schumacher

The appearance of some optical illusions is not influenced by the perceiver's beliefs. For instance, even if I know the cognitive mechanisms which are responsible for the Müller-Lyer illusion, the two lines still look to me to be of unequal length. Optical illusions of this kind are thus cognitively impenetrable. How can we explain this, and is it adequate to regard the cognitive impenetrability of optical illusions as evidence for the claim that some sense perceptions are entirely theory-neutral? In this paper I intend to show that Berkeley's theory of perception gives better answers to these questions than Fodor's theory of the modularity of the mind. Berkeley's approach is particularly interesting because he explains the visual perception of geometric properties as the result of experience *and* custom. Accordingly, how things look for us, depends not only on the experiences, but also on the perceptual habits acquired by the perceiver. In contrast to Fodor's theory, Berkeley's approach is able to account for the cognitive impenetrability of optical illusions as well as for their epistemic character.

"Heterogeneity and the Blind Man"
by Robert Schwartz

The account of Berkeley's heterogeneity thesis in "Heterogeneity and the Senses" stopped short of squaring the analysis with Berkeley's well-known negative answer to the Molyneux problem. This follow-up essay tries to remedy the situation. It places emphasis on the fact that Berkeley appeals to "man born blind" thought experiments throughout the

TV, not just in his discussion of figure. Consideration of Berkeley's arguments in these cases is important for understanding his answer to Molyneux's specific question. Several alternative accounts of Berkeley's goals and position are critically examined.

"Berkeley's '*Esse* is *Percipi*' and Collier's 'Simple' Argument"
by Tom Stoneham

A little noticed passage in Collier's *Clavis Universalis* (1713) bears a striking resemblance to one of Berkeley's more puzzling arguments (*Principles* 3), where he claims to show we can have an "intuitive knowledge" that the *esse* of sensible things is *percipi*. While the arguments appear to have different starting points, Berkeley's beginning with the meaning of "exists" and Collier's with our knowledge of existence, I show that both turn upon the same general principle, namely the transparency of perception. This raises the question of why the two authors took this principle to be so obvious that they did not need to articulate it. I propose that they both understood the perceptual relation between a subject and a sensible thing in such a way that failures of transparency would be impossible.